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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a limited partnership, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 19096 
vs. 
ROLLINS, BROWN & GUNNELL, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONOP.ABI.E MAURICE HAP.DING, JUDGE, and 
PONORABLE DAVIC SAM, JUDGE, presiding. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Several of respondent's statements of fact find no sup-
port in the record. First, the record does not support 
respondent's assertion that Mr. Marshall, the job superin-
tendent for John Price Associates, selected the starting 
point of respondent's staking of the corners of the Skaggs' 
building. Respondent's brief at 3, 11. In fact, David 
Thurgood, the witness relied upon by respondent to establish 
this point, stated that Mr. Marshall did not point out the 
stake as being the correct stake. 
Q. Mr. Marshall didn't go out there and say this 
stake is the northwest property corner and used 
to stake the building, did he? 
A. I don't have any recollection he said that, no. 
Q. You assumed that the flagged rebar was the prop-
erty corner, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
R. 423-24. 
The record also fails to support respondent's assertion 
that appellant acquired additional property (due to a dis-
crepancy between the fence line and title line) after 
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell staked the property corners and, 
therefore, the survey was no longer correct. Respondent's 
brief at 4. The testimony cited by respondent as supporting 
this assertion does not do so. In fact, Russell Brown 
testified that property corners had been staked for both the 
fence line and title line descriptions. R. 380. Mr. Brown 
further testified that he was aware of the difference between 
the two stakes and that the field notes of the survey 
reflected which stake marked the fence line and which stake 
marked the property line. R. 380. In short, the respon-
dent's assertion that property was acquired north of the 
fence line after the survey was conducted, creating a new 
northwest property corner, is contrary to the testimony of 
Mr. Brown and is not supported by the record. 
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Finally, the record does not support respondent's conten-
tion that it was not hired to locate the foundation for the 
Skaggs building on appellant's property. Respondent's brief 
at 10. The evidence is undisputed that Rollins, Brown & 
Gunnell was hired to stake the property corners of appel-
lant's property. Respondent did so, marking the property 
corners with 1-inch diameter rebars. R. 429. Pltf. Ex. 4. 
Mr. Thurgood testified that the corner he used as a starting 
point to lay out the building was marked with a 1-inch 
diameter rebar and a 1-inch by 2-incP wooden stake. "N.W. 
property corner" was written on the wooden stake, indicating 
that the rebar marked the northwest property corner. R. 
428. Mr. Thurgood also stated that the wooden stake and 
rebar would have been placed by "representatives of persons 
that performed the survey of Rollins, Brown & Gunnell ••• " 
R. 431. 
When respondent returned in 1974 to stake the corners of 
the Skaggs building, it used the northwest corner that it had 
previously staked as a starting point. R. 412-13. Unfor-
tunately, the northwest corner had been staked 30 feet south 
of the point shown on the site plan, resulting in defendant 
locating the Skaggs building 30 feet south of its intended 
location. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPON-
DENT A NEW TRIAL. 
The parties apparently agree that the district court's 
order granting a new trial should be affirmed if the record 
contains substantial competent evidence which would support a 
verdict for respondent. However, the parties disagree on 
whether the record contains such substantial competent evi-
dence. 
At the time this matter was tried, the pleadings estab-
lished that Rollins, Brown & Gunnell erred in staking the 
northwest corner of appellant's property when it performed 
the survey in 1973. While respondent "now denies having made 
a mistake" [Respondent's brief at 9], the mistake was 
admitted at trial. Respondent now contends that admission of 
the mistake does not necessarily admit negligence. Instead, 
respondent argues that Mr. Marshall, the job superintendent, 
assisted Mr. Thurgood in selecting the stake to be used as a 
starting point. As indicated above, this argument has no 
basis in the record. In fact, Mr. Thurgood stated that Mr. 
Marshall did not select the stake as a starting point. R. 
423-24. In any event, the stake was placed and marked as the 
"N.W. property corner" by respondent. It is this initial 
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mistake in surveying the property and marking the corners 
that caused the erroneous staking of the Skaggs building. 
Respondent also contends that there was no expert testi-
mony on the standard of care applicable to the surveying and 
engineering professions and, therefore, appellant failed to 
establish prima facia case of negligence. By admitting the 
mistake in the answer, the elements of duty and breach in the 
negligence case were no longer at issue. All that remained 
were the issues of proximate cause and damage. Were respon-
dent's argument to be accepted, the trial court would have 
granted its motion to dismiss at the close of appellant's 
evidence. This was not done, the motion was denied. 
Respondent fails to note that the survey was certified as 
being accurate by its agent, Carr Greer. R. 317. In addi-
tion, expert testimony is not necessary in this sort of 
case. By analogy, a surgeon's negligence in leaving a sponge 
in a patient may be established without expert testimony. If 
the act is clearly negligent, no expert testimony is neces-
sary to establish the standard of care. See Nauman v. Harold 
K. Beecher & Associates, 467 P.2d 610 (Utah 1970). No expert 
testimony is necessary to establish that a surveyor has 
failed to exercise ordinary care when he erroneously stakes a 
boundary corner by thirty feet, especially when the survey is 
certified as being accurate. The idea behind this notion is 
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that, in some cases, the mistake is so obvious that even a 
layman can recognize the error. Such is the case here. 
In any event, the record contains expert testimony demon-
strating the standard of care required and breach of that 
standard by respondent. For example, Russell Brown testified 
that two sets of property corners were staked, indicating the 
fence line and title line. The survey field notes reflected 
which stake was a fence line and which stake was a property 
line. R. 380. Unfortunately, the field notes differ from 
reality, since Mr. Thurgood testified that the northwest 
property corner was located south of where it should have 
been. 
John Price, who holds an engineering degree and has 
extensive experience in construction, testified, "There is no 
engineer in the world that would stake out a building without 
a survey." R. 238, 258. However, David Thurgood did not 
have a copy of the survey with him at the time the Skaggs 
building corners were staked. R. 418. The evidence devel-
oped at trial, from both parties' witnesses, demonstrated 
that it was not the custom and practice in the surveying 
profession to erroneously stake a boundary corner or to stake 
a building 30 feet south of where it was shown on the site 
plan. Moreover, respondent admitted, at trial and in its 
pleadings, that it erroneously staked the boundary corner of 
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appellant's property. It was this act of negligence which 
resulted in damages. In short, there is no substantial com-
petent evidence in the record which would support a verdict 
for respondent on the issue of negligence. 
Respondent also argues that appellant failed to act rea-
sonably to mitigate its damages. First, as noted in Appel-
lant's Brief, respondent failed to plead this issue and miti-
gation was not properly before the trial court. This court 
held in Pratt v. Board of Education of Uintah County School 
District, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977), that a party must plead 
the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages or be 
barred from litigating the issue at trial. An answer to an 
interrogatory does not sufficiently raise the issue to permit 
the rule requiring pleading to be ignored. 
Secondly, appellant acted reasonably as a matter of law. 
Although respondent suggests that the jury reasonably could 
have concluded that Price acted summarily in rejecting the 
alternatives offered by respondent, it is clear that 
appellant would have incurred substantial inconvenience and 
risk by attempting to remedy the damage in the fashion 
suggested. For example, a delay of 10 days, the time 
estimated by Russell Brown to correct the problem (assuming 
that a con- tractor, the equipment and the personnel were 
immediately available), would have cost appellant one-half of 
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its loan commitment fee, or $19,000. If Mr. Brown was mis-
taken and the repairs actually took over 30 days, appellant 
would have lost an additional $19,000. As a matter of law, 
appellant was not required to assume these risks, simply to 
attempt to minimize the damages caused by respondent's negli-
gence. 
In addition, there was substantial disagreement between 
the parties as to the costs ?f repairing the damage and 
moving the Skaggs building 30 feet to the north. The issue 
is whether appellant acted reasonably at the time action was 
required. The information available to appellant indicated 
that it would cost approximately $100,000 to repair the dam-
age. There was no evidence that this estimate was unreason-
able or was arrived at in an unreasonable manner. Thus, 
appellant acted reasonably given the information available to 
it at the time action was required. 
Respondent also contends appellant suffered no damages, 
since there is insufficient parking to permit the construc-
tion of an additional 2,100 square feet of shop space at the 
shopping center. First, there is no substantial competent 
evidence to support this allegation. Randall Deschamps, the 
Orem City Planning Director from 1972 to 1978, testified that 
the parking requirements for a shopping center vary with the 
use to which the property is put. R. 402-03. On this issue, 
Russell Brown testified as follows: 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
R. 364. 
So depending on the use to which the space in 
the center is being put at a given point in 
time, it may have sufficient parking at one 
point in time and yet insufficient parking at 
another point in time, depending upon the par-
ticular use that is being made of the space at 
that time, isn't that correct? 
I suppose that would be right, yes. 
In other words, if the whole thing was one big 
restaurant it would require significantly more 
parking than if it's one big Skaggs store, isn't 
that correct. 
That is true. 
Respondent's evidence merely indicates that as of 
the time its witnesses examined the shopping center, in 1980, 
there was insufficient parking for the current use of the 
buildings. There is no substantial competent evidence demon-
strating that an additional 2,100 square feet in shop space 
could not be built (if current usage was altered) and could 
not have been built in 1974. 
Secondly, the issue of parking availability is irrelevant 
since appellant's damages were fixed as of the date of the 
injury, i.e., 1974. The evidence is undisputed that there 
was sufficient parking at the shopping center in 1974 to con-
struct the shopping center as planned and, in fact, building 
permits were issued for all of the buildings on the site 
plan. R. 397-98. 
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There was no substantial competent evidence to support a 
verdict for respondent on either the issue of liability or 
damages; consequently, the district court erred in granting 
respondent a new trial. This court should reverse the order 
granting a new trial and remand with instructions to rein-
state the jury verdict for appellant, or, in the alternative, 
remand for a new trial on the issue of damages only. 
POINT If 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT JPA 
WAS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY. 
John Price Associates, Inc. ("JPA") was the contractor on 
the construction project. JPA issued the purchase order pur-
suant to which Rollins, Brown & Gunnell staked the Skaggs 
building. Prior to the second trial of this matter, the dis-
trict court held, sua sponte, that JPA was a necessary and 
indispensable party to the action, apparently because of its 
contractual relationship with respondent. This ruling was 
erroneous since appellant may maintain a negligence action 
against the respondent, and such was the nature of the Com-
plaint in this matter. 
In order for a duty to arise between respondent and 
appellant, it must be reasonably foreseeable that appellant 
may be injured as a result of respondent's negligence. The 
rule set forth in Restatement of Torts, § 552, is merely a 
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species of foreseeability. In order to impose liability for 
damages, Section 552 requires: (1) that the actor fail to 
exercise that care and competence in obtaining and communi-
cating the information which its recipient is justified in 
expecting, and (2) that the harm be suffered by a person for 
whose guidance the information was supplied and as a result 
of his justifiable reliance upon the information. The second 
prong of this test is merely a requirement that the injury be 
foreseeable. 
In the instant matter, the injury to Price-Orem Invest-
ment is reasonably foreseeable. Respondent incorrectly sur-
veyed and staked the corners of appellant's property. 
Respondent later staked the building corners of the shopping 
center, using the incorrect boundary corner as a starting 
point. Certainly it is foreseeable that the owner of the 
property, the entity for whose benefit the building is being 
built, will be injured by the surveyor's negligence. 
A rule requiring an owner to sue its contractor, who in 
turn may sue the surveyor, creates an unnecessary complex-
ity. The damage to appellant was reasonably foreseeable and, 
therefore, respondent owed a duty to refrain from negligent 
acts. The court's order dismissing the complaint for failure 
to join JPA was in error and should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
There was no substantial competent evidence to support a 
verdict for respondent; consequently, the trial court erred 
in granting a new trial. The district court also erred in 
ruling that JPA was a necessary and indispensable party. 
This court should reverse the orders of the district court 
and remand with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict, 
or, in the alternative, remand for a new trial on damages 
only, or, in the further alternative, remand for a new trial. 
DATED this qfl...--day of November, 1983. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
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